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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - THE EIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
-

ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY

Dutton v. Evans,
400 U. S. 74 (1970).
Since Pointer v. Texas1 - which held the confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment applicable to the states - several Supreme
Court cases have dealt with the constitutional restraints on the admission of hearsay evidence and the right of a defendant to crossexamine the witnesses against him.2 These cases have tended to
limit the admissibility of hearsay and expand the guaranty of crossexamination. The Court's recent decision in Dutton v. Evans,3 however, marks a departure from the rationale that had been developing
in the post-Pointer decisions.
In Dutton, the state's hearsay testimony was admitted by a
Georgia trial court against the defendant, Evans, although the prosecution had made no effort to secure the declarant's presence at the
trial.4 The hearsay was admitted because of Georgia's statutory
hearsay exception for coconspirators' declarations made during the
concealment phase of a conspiracy. 5 The testimony at issue in Dutton was given by a man named Shaw. At the trial, Shaw recalled
a statement made to him by Williams, one of the principals to the
murder for which Evans was being tried. Shaw testified that he had
asked Williams about the latter's arraignment and that Williams
had responded by denouncing Evans as the cause of his problems. 6
Shaw was cross-examined by Evans, but the hearsay-declarant, Williams, did not appear at the trial. The Supreme Court of Georgia
upheld the admission of this testimony on appeal.' In a habeus cor1380 U.S. 400 (1965).

2
See, e.g., Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
3400 U.S. 74 (1970).
4 The statement was originally made in a federal penitentiary located in Georgia.
Id. at 77. It would have been easy to secure the dedarant's presence at the trial since
he presumably was still incarcerated within the state. See id. at 88 n.19; id. at 102
n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5 GA. COD ANN. § 38-306 (1954).
6The exact statement attributed by Shaw to Williams was: "If it hadn't been for that
dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." 400 U.S. at 77.
7 Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 150 S.E.2d 240, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 953 (1966).
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pus proceeding, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found the
evidence inadmissible and reversed Evans' conviction.' The Supreme
Court then reversed the court of appeals, with five Justices agreeing
that introduction of the testimony was not prohibited by the right to
confrontation or other due process considerations.
The confrontation clause9 raises several questions, 10 one of the
more important of which is who are witnesses within the meaning
of the clause. The Supreme Court has avoided laying down a broad
theory about the requirements of the confrontation clause, and consequently this particular question has not been explicitly answered.
In its decisions following Pointer,however, the Court has held that
the confrontation clause prohibits the state from: (1) introducing
an individual's testimony through a transcript from a preliminary
hearing if the state failed to make reasonable efforts to produce him
at the trial, even though the individual was fully cross-examined by
the defendant at the preliminary hearing;"' or (2) reading a document purporting to be a confession of another principal, even
though police officers testify and are cross-examined on whether
the confession was in fact made by the declarant-principal. 1' But
the state may introduce out-of-court statements if the declarant also
appears as a witness and is cross-examined at the trial itself.' 3 Because these rules place limits on the use of hearsay (even where
the nondeclarant witness can be fully cross-examined at trial), the
Court has implicitly treated the hearsay-declarant as a witness for
the purposes of the confrontation clause. Thus, prior to Dutton,
Williams would definitely have been classified as a witness within
the ambit of the right to confrontation.
In Dutton, the plurality opinion 14 by Mr. Justice Stewart took the
unprecedented step of allowing hearsay to be introduced in the ab8
9

Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).

The confrontation clause requires that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10An examination of the clause's language and history is made in California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175-79 (1970).
11See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968).
12 Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
See also Roberts v. Russell, 392
U.S. 293 (1968); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384
U.S. 1 (1966).
13 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
14 The plurality consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Stewart, and
Blackmun. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred separately. Justices Black, Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan dissented in an opinion by Mr. Justice Marshall.
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sence of any cross-examination of the declarant, but still failed to
provide a general theory concerning the requirements of the confrontation clause. The opinion did not mention whether the hearsay-declarant is still considered a witness within the meaning of the
confrontation clause. Instead, Mr. Justice Stewart apparently concluded that cross-examination of the declarant is not required when
the Court is satisfied that the hearsay is reliable and that the jury is
likely to give the "proper" weight to the testimony. 5 If the plurality still believes that the declarant is a witness for purposes of the
right to confrontation (they appear to accept this view since they
unhesitatingly affirm the precedents),' 6 the reliability approach is
difficult to reconcile with the absolute command of the sixth amendment that the witness be confronted.
Mr. Justice Stewart apparently would consider the confrontation
clause inapplicable whenever the testimony fulfilled certain pragmatic tests of reliability. The Dutton plurality believed that these
tests were satisfied by a combination of several factors: (1) the
statement contained no express assertion of fact and therefore was
presumed to warn the jury about its inherent lack of evidentiary
value; (2) Williams' knowledge of the crime and its participants
had been so firmly established that the Court believed cross-examination could not have shown that he was not in a position to know
whether Evans was involved in the murder; (3) in view of Williams' apparent involvement in the crime, his recollection was
deemed beyond impeachment by cross-examination; and (4) the circumstances surrounding the statement were considered sufficient to
show that Williams probably did not lie.'7 The effect of relying on
such tests in Dutton, or in future cases, is to abrogate the unequivocal right to confrontation, and to make the right instead turn on the
Court's view of the value of confrontation in a particular case.
One difficulty with the plurality's approach is the uncertainty it
creates about where a right to confrontation still exists. If Mr. Justice Stewart's reasoning were followed to its logical conclusion,
cross-examination of a witness who actually appeared at trial could
be prohibited consistently with the Constitution if his testimony satisfied the Dutton tests. A less drastic application of the Dutton
rationale, however, would limit it to exceptions to the hearsay rule,
15 400 U.S. at 89. Mr. Justice Stewart also mentioned that the challenged hearsay
evidence was not "devastating" or "crucial." Id. at 87.
16 Id. at 84-90.
17 Id. at 88-89.
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thus leaving intact the unqualified right to cross-examine witnesses
who appear at trial. This latter reading would treat witnesses
who appear at trial differently from witnesses who utter hearsay and
do not appear at trial. This position is difficult to accept because
it gives the explicit right to confrontation different meanings where
different witnesses are concerned.
Another problem with the plurality approach lies in determining
when testimony is reliable enough to make it unnecessary for the
hearsay declarant to testify. The dissent makes an equally cogent
argument for the value of cross-examining the declarant Williams.'"
If unreliability becomes a prerequisite to cross-examination, it is
questionable whether the Court will be able to delineate worthwhile,
clear guidelines necessary to make a determination of what is unreliable. Most likely, the meaning of the confrontation clause
would become very subjective and vague.'9
The plurality also mentioned that the jury would give minimum
weight to Shaw's testimony since the statement attributed to Williams contained "no express assertion about past fact."20 This reasoning apparently implies that imprecise hearsay is less in need of
cross-examination than clear and unequivocal statements. The opposite position, however, is equally persuasive because vague testimony is just the type which should be clarified by cross-examining
the declarant.2 ' Moreover, in view of the reasoning in Bruton v.
United States22 - holding that the judge's instructions to ignore an
inadmissible confession of a codefendant did not provide sufficient
protection to the other defendant - it is questionable whether the
Court should rely on such simplistic assumptions about how the
jury reacts to the testimony.2 3
18

Id. at 103-04.

19 From a psychological perspective, the Court's ability to ascertain the reliability of
evidence is extremely questionable. See generally Marshall, The Evidence, 2 PSYCHOL.
TODAY, Feb. 1969, at 48. Because the Court typically relies upon its own subjective
notions of human behavior rather than upon empirical studies, its assessments of reliability would probably be worthless. A thorough discussion of the requirements for
studying human behavior is made in E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1961).
20 400 U.S. at 88.
21 Without stating its position in quite this way, the dissent argued that the vagueness of Williams' alleged statement could have been alleviated by cross-examining him.
Id. at 103-04.
22 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
23 Just as the Court's assessment of reliability is likely to be subjective, its traditional reliance on unscientific notions of human behavior would also inhibit an accurate
appraisal of jury behavior. See note 19 supra.
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Nevertheless, the plurality argued that cross-examination is unnecessary because the jury would not give undue weight to Williams' testimony. Reliable evidence should have a great impact on
the jury,24 and according to the above reasoning should be subject
to full cross-examination. But Mr. Justice Stewart concluded just
the opposite: that reliable evidence is actually less in need of crossexamination. Thus, the plurality does an abrupt about-face and
adopts directly contrary positions. First, the slight impact of the
testimony is claimed to reduce the need for cross-examination. Yet
in the very next moment the need for cross-examination of the most
persuasive testimony is completely ignored.
The opinion of the plurality dearly has left several important
questions unanswered, and the situation is even further complicated
by the lack of a majority opinion. Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion takes a novel tack and states that confrontation pertains
solely to the procedure followed in introducing evidence. By this
view, cross-examination of infrajudicial evidence is all that is guaranteed by the sixth amendment, and consequently cross-examination
of Shaw's infrajudicial statements was the sole mandate of the right
to confrontation.2 5 Mr. Justice Harlan does believe, however, that
the introduction of hearsay is controlled by the general requirements
of the due process clauses of the fifth and 14th amendments. In
testing Shaw's statement by the "standard" of due process, he concludes that it is admissible because "a person weighing the necessity for hearsay evidence of [this).type... against the danger that
a jury will give it undue credit might reasonably conclude that admission of the evidence would increase the likelihood of just determinations of truth."2 This view of the constitutional restriction
on hearsay suffers from vagueness similar to that of the plurality.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to predict the position any
of these five Justices will take in new evaluations of exceptions to
the hearsay rule.
Although the plurality purports to find no fault with earlier confrontation cases, the holdings of several of them are definitely threatened by Dutton. In Douglas v. Alabama,2 7 the prosecutor read an
24 Because the plurality assumes that vague, imprecise statements are not weighed
heavily by the jury, it seems it would conversely agree that a very reliable statement has
a great impact. This premise is meant only as a reflection of the plurality's internal logic,
not as a scientific assessment of human behavior.

25 400 U.S. at 94-95.
26 Id. at 99.
2T7
380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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inculpating statement that he claimed was the confession of another
principal. Although three police officers testified and were crossexamined about whether the confession was indeed made by the
alleged principal, the Court held that only cross-examination of the
declarant would satisfy the confrontation clause. In Dutton, the
sole source of the hearsay was a fellow inmate of the declarant.
The plurality tries to distinguish Douglas by saying the prosecutor
misbehaved when he read the alleged confession;2 8 but the distinction is tenuous. Douglas turned on the failure to cross-examine the
declarant himself,2 9 not on the fact that the prosecutor was a quasiwitness. Because the police who testified and were cross-examined
in Douglas fulfilled the same function as did Shaw in the Dutton
case, there is no meaningful difference between the two cases.
Brookhart v. Janis3" also seems at odds with Dutton. Brookhart
explicitly held that the admission of a codefendant's inculpating
confession was violative of the right to confrontation if the codefendant was not present at the trial. A paper transcript was used
by the state in Brookhart, and the plurality used this fact to distinguish it from Dutton.3 ' The use of a paper transcript is indeed
relevant to confrontation because of the consequent inability to observe the declarant's demeanor. In light of subsequent cases, however, Brookhart must be read as having been based principally on
the denial of cross-examination of the declarant, rather than on the
use of a paper transcript. 2 Looking only at the denial of crossexamination, Brookhart is squarely contrary to Dutton. Only if Williams had been cross-examined would the Brookhart rule have been
satisfied. In any case, the declarant's demeanor was completely lost
in Dutton, as well as in Brookhart. Consequently, the claimed distinction of a paper transcript is meaningless.
Dutton also poses a threat to the case of Barber v. Page.33 According to Barber, a witness's testimony at a preliminary hearing
28400 U.S. at 87.
29 380 U.S. at 419.
30 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
31 400 U.S. at 87. The plurality also mentions that Brookhart involved a wholesale denial of cross-examination in addition to the admission of the confession, implying that this fact distinguished Brookhart from Dutton. Id. But Brookhart explicitly
held that the introduction of the codefendant's confession was, by itself, a violation of
the right to confrontation. 384 U.S. at 4.
32 See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 188 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
-3390

U.S. 719 (1968).

